The design of niutritioni intervenltionis can be very' susceptible to the level of aggregation of available informationi. 
Age is a good indicator f( identifying at-risk * How useful is it to kinow thc caloric reallopopulation groups for intervenitions that focus on cation outcome if age is used as a targeting prevention rather than cure. But whait is the ideal instrumcint ? upper age limit for tar-geting intcrvcintionls to minimize undernutrition>?
Age proved to be a good indicator of undernutrition wheni researchers had data on individual Within the framework of upper-limit indicanutrition and on the intra-lhouschold allocation of tor targeting, Haddad and Kanlbur addrcssed calories. certain questions:
Age was apparently less uselul aIs a targetinig * How far wrong can one go using only instrument when only houseihold-level dala on household-level data on nutrition?
calorie adequacy were used. TIlhc cnors in agebased targeting were theefoire significanit. * How valuable is thc extra infotmnation one gets from costlier intra-household surveys on Food sharing rcndered age trulY less useful nutrition?
as a targeting instrumcnt because oflecakaige within thc houseihold. Calories tarmted to the * How far wrong can one go by neglecting the younger household members cnd up reaching the intra-houschold repercussions of nutritionazl older individuals. interventions -for example, supplemeints to a child being nullified by equivalent reductions in food to the chiild in the home? 
INTF-JCTION
Nutritional interventions exist in many developing countries.
They are of course to be found as emergency relief programs after disasters or famines, but regular supplementary feeding programs are also widespread. A key question for these programs is targeting.
Since resources are limited, some method has to be adopted of making sure that nutritional supplements are given to those who need it most.
The most effective method is to evaluate the nutrient shortfall from a given standard for each individual and to supply exactly this amount of supplement and no more. But such fine targeting is not possible on the ground, and practitioners rely on more easily observable indicators. Examples of such methods are levels and trends in anthropometric indicators such as weight-for-height, weight-for-age, and upper arm circumference. However, if the intervention is fccussed specifically on prevention rather than cure, age is acknowledged to be one of the better ways of identifying at-ri:k population groups (Kennedy and Alderman 1986 It will be recognized that the above question is part of the general class of indicator targeting problems, as developed by Akerlof (1978) . We refer to it as the problem of unoer-liMit indicatgr irgiUtng.
The first objective of this paper is thus to develop a framework for upper-limit indicator targeting, and to illustrate it for the case of age-based nutritional interventions using individual level, intrahousehold survey data from the Philippines. Although the data used provide only an approximation to individual nutritional achievements within the household, most surveys in developing countries do not provide even this information. How far wrong can one go with only household level data on nutrition? The second objective of this paper is therefore to provide a quantitative estimate of the value of the extra information that the costlier intra-household survey provides, when the objective is to design optimally targeted nutritional interventions. There is, however, a recognition in the nutrition literature that such interventions cannot be seen independently of the nature of the intrahousehold nutritional allocaticn, since a supplement to a child can be nullified by an equivalent reduction in 2 Infants in the age range 6-36 months are especially highly targeted as (1) they are vulnerable to undernutrition (low energy density weaning foods for example), and infection (the move from breast feeding to weaning foods, and increased toddler mobility for example) and (2) the functional consequences of poor health are more severe for this age group.
.3-feeding at home (Alderman 1990) . The third objective of the paper is therefore to provide a quantitative assessment of how far wrong one goes by neglecting the intrahousehold repercussions of a nutritional intervention. We start, howevpr, with some basic theory on indicator targeting.
UPPER-LINIT INDICATOR TARGETING: THEORY
Let 0 denote a measure of nutritional adequacy (for example, the calorie adequacy ratio for an individual) and t the age of an individual. Let f(0,t) be the Joint density of the two variables in the population. If z measures a normatively given "adequate level for 0, (e.g. z -1 for calorie adequacy), then a measure of the extent of undernutrition in the population is given by
00 z
It will be recognized that this measure of undernutrition is analogous to the measure of poverty put forward by Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984) . Variants of it have been discussed in the context of undernutrition by Kakwani (1989) and Ravallion (1990) . This will be the workhorse of our analysis of nutritional targeting-the object of policy will be to reduce the value of Pa as given by (l Before introducing policy, notice that P. can be rewritten using the fact that
where a(0 I t) is the conditional density of 0 given t and h(t) is the marginal density of t in the population. Using (2), (') becomes
In other words, total undernutrition is simply the sum of undernutrition at each age level, weighted by the proportioit of population at that age level.
We sappose that the policy maker has a total amount of nutritional supplement B to dispense. If each individual 0 could be observed costlessly the policy program would be easy-simply find those for whom 0 is less than z and administer the right amount of y supplement. But on the ground this is impos.'Nle to do and other criteria are used. One such criterion is an tpper age limit T such that only those with age less than or equal to T receive the supplement. If there exists a household survey that allows us to estimate the bivariate density f(o,t), this could be used to choose the optimal value of T, such that Pe is minimized for the given amount of rasources B. But how?
We have to specify how the supplement is distributed to those who meet the criterion. The simplest model, and also the most practicable method, is to distribute the supplement equally among those 'let through the door" on the criterion that their age be less than or equal to T. There are H(T) individuals of age less than or equal to T where H(-) is the cumulative distribution of the density h(.). Thus each individual who satisfies the criterion gets an amount B/H(T) and the new level of undernutrition is given by
The central question is what happens to Pe (B,T) when T changes for given B. Differentiating (4) with respect to T we get:
The two terms on the right hand side of (5) capture the conflicting effects on undernutrition when the upper age limit is increased at the margin, so that more people are drawn into the net. These new people get a supplement so their nutrition improves-this is the second term on the right hand side of (5). But with the new people there is less to go around, anJ those already in the net lose out. This intramarginal' effect is captured by the first term on the right hand side of (5). As shown in Kanbur (1987) , the impact of a small decrease in transfer on Pi is proportional to P,. 1 and this term consists precisely of expressions of this type.
Further insight into (5) can be derived by specializing to the case of a -1. Then (5) becomes
Further manipulation on P, (B,T I T) and P, (O,T I T) leads to dPj (B,T)
From (7), the impact of a change in T on undernutrition as measured by P, de .)nds on two factors. First, there is the extent to which the incidence of undernutrition for those with age less than or equal to T exceeds or falls below the incidence of undernutritien for those at age T. Second, there is the extent of original undernutrition of those of age T who stop being undernourished with the intervention.
While the second term is somewhat convoluted, the first term is intuitive--it is the difference between the marginal and the inframarginal incidence of undernutrition for given T.
The optimal value of the age cut-off occurs when (5) is zero.
Denote this by T*. But it can be seen that this leads to a complex equation for T that cannot be solved in closed form. A numerical analysis is required, and we now turn to that in the context of a specific data set.
OPTIMAL AGE CUT OFFS FOR NUTRITIONAL TARGETING: AN APPLICATION TO PHILIPPINE DATA
The data set used here comes from a household survey in the Philippines. The data and methods of collection are descriued fully in Bouls and Haddad (1990) . The data contain information on nutrition among 448 households in the southern Philippine province of Bukidnon,
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collected and averaged over four rounds to account for seasonality and other fluctuations. The distinctive feature of the data Is that the food intake of each individual in the household was obtained. The 24-hour recall method was used (for an evaluation of this method, see Bouis and Haddad, 1990) . This intake can be converted into calories using standard conversion factors. !n addition, we can calculate the calorie requirement for each individual baWed on 32 age-genderpregnancy status categories. For this reason, the data are to he viewed as illustrative rather than definitive measures nf individuallevel nutrient adequacy. 3 The calorie adequacy ratio, the ratio of intake to requirement, is our measure of undernutrition in this application, and we use a calorie adequacy ratio of one as our benchmark (i.e. z -1, in terms of the formulae in the previous section). We will refer to this as a "poverty line", although it is clear that in our application it is an 'adequate nutrition line". eventually this balance is reversed, and there is an optimal T. We call this our scenario 1.
How does the optimal T, T, depend on a and B, the parameters of the problem? Table I presents values of the optimal upper age eligibility for various values of a and B and figure 4 plots this surface. It is seen that, by and large, T* increases in a and in B.
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The fact that T increases in B is intuitive -when there are more resources, mors people can be optimally brought into the net. The fact that T* increases in a is related to a greater depth of undernutrition at the mdargin rather than infra-marginally. At lower age eligibilities there are so few who qualify for supplement that those within the net are pushed far above the poverty line, therefore there is no inframarginal undernutrition, and as a increases, undernutrition at the margin is weighed more heavily, and the optimal T is reached at higher ages.
THE VALUE OF INTRA-HOUSEHOLD INFORMATION
The analysis of the previous section is based on a survey that collects information on individual nutrition within the household.
Bt;t most surveys available to planners in developing countries collect food consumption information only at the household level. The usual method of proceeding is ths;i to calculate a measure of household calorie ade uacy, and to attribute this to each individual in the household. Intra-household inequality is therefore ignored.
Intra-household information on nutrition is costly to collect and it would be useful to know the benefits from its collection. In particular, how useful is it in targeting? With our data set, we can provide an answer to this question. As before, let O be the true individual calorie adequacy ratio and denote by $ the individual calorie consumption adequacy ratio when each individual is simply allocated the household's calorie adequacy ratio. Without information on individual intakes, we would be forced to use the bivariate distribution of $ and t, to calculate the optimal upper age eligibility. We call this our scenario 2. Denote the optimal value of T as t . Thus all those with age less than V will get nutrition supplement B/H( ' ). Undernutrition with this supplement is given by expression (4) with T - Figure If B. is the solution of the following equation:
the difference between B. and B represents the extra calories (or equivalent gain5)that would be needed to achieve the same level of undernutrition reduction with the 'wrong' age cutoff, t! , as was achieved with the correct age cutoff, T'. 
INTRA-HOUSEHOLD ALLOCATION. LEAKAGE AND THE INPLICATIONS FOR TARGETING
The analysis so far has assumed zero sharing of the calorie intervention that the eligible individual brings into the household.
Either because the intervention is divided within the household, or through reductions in non-intervention calorie intake of the eligible member, it is highly unlikely that intervention calories add, one-for one, to the total calories consumed by the eligible individual. What are the implications for the age-based targeting of calorie leakage from the eligible individual to his or her fellow household members?
Does it still make sense? In general, this depends on the extent to which there is intrahousehold calorie allocation away from the targeted group (TG), i.e. children. These tradeoffs are represented in Table 3 .
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